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Abstract 
In this paper, we test whether economic growth decreases child labour by bringing together data 
from the National Sample Survey of India and state-level macro data to estimate a bivariate probit 
model of schooling and labour. Our results lead us to conclude that contrary to popular wisdom, 
growth actually increases rather than decreases child labour because it increases the demand for 
child workers. The level of state NDP, village wages and household incomes are seen as the 
conduits through which growth influences the supply side of the child labour market.  
 
 
Keywords: Child labour, Schooling, Growth, Kuznets curve, Pro-poor growth, Asia, India 
 
 
 3 
Acknowledgements: We are grateful for comments from participants of departmental seminars at 
the Universities of Reading and Birmingham and to Marina Della Giusta for comments on an earlier 
version of this paper. We would like to thank the referees of this journal for extremely constructive 
comments, which have helped to improve the paper considerably. Finally, we would like to thank 
the Department for International Development, UK, for funding the project that made this research 
possible. 
 
 4 
Economic Growth: A Panacea for Child Labour? 
 
Does growth decrease child labour? Much long range historical and cross-country evidence seems 
to suggest that it does. Clearly, child labour participation rates have decreased in almost all 
countries over time. International evidence also indicates that the labour participation rates of 
children have decreased across the world between 1950 and 2000 (see Table 1). The decline has 
been significant in all regions of the world, bringing the world average down from 27.6% in 1950 to 
11.3% in 2000. In Europe, the fall has brought the child labour participation rate down to 0.04%
1
 
and even in India child labour participation rates decreased from 35.43% to 12.07% during this 
period. 
Insert Table 1 here 
More detailed regional and historical evidence, however, seems to suggest that economic growth 
has led to increasing child labour participation. Thus, Swaminathan (1998), studying child labour in 
a fast-growing region of India finds an increase in the numbers of children employed. Heywood 
(1988) also argues that the early phase of industrialisation in the UK brought an increased reliance 
on child labour. In this paper, we will analyse this relationship between the rate of growth of an 
economy and the extent of child labour that exists within it.  
 
The impact of macroeconomic performance on child labour and schooling has attracted 
considerable attention in the literature (Grootaert and Patrinos, 1999; Swaminathan, 1998; Barros et 
al, 1994; Neri and Thomas, 2001; Kak, 2004; Weiner, 1991). This paper adds to this literature by 
testing the relationship empirically across an extensive dataset -- Schedule 50 of the National 
Sample Survey of India. This data is particularly appropriate in the context of our analysis covering 
as it does about 15 major states, each with very varied macroeconomic performance and socio-
cultural environments. In addition, the federal nature of many of India’s institutions and the 
uniformity of data across the country facilitate our analysis.  
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The paper makes two main contributions to the literature. First, it attempts to separate out the 
determinants of the supply of child labour from the demand for child labour. Basu et al (2003) state 
that ‘the demand side factors (of child labour) are not observable and have earlier been ignored’ so 
that ‘all the data available to us as well as those used in earlier empirical studies on this topic relate 
to the supply side of child labour’ (Basu et al, 2003, p.11). They attempt to correct for this by 
including village level fixed effects which proxy for the impact of regional prosperity on household 
incomes, infrastructure and on opportunities for employment. In this paper, we separate out these 
different effects by including average village wages, state level net domestic product (NDP), state 
growth rates and the contribution of agricultural production to the NDP of each state. Some of these 
factors - average village wages and state level NDP – proxy for the effect that the regional 
environment may have on household income or in providing better facilities for schooling. Thus, 
they influence the supply side of the child labour market. Other factors - state growth rates and the 
proportion of agricultural production in the NDP of each state – on the other hand, are more likely 
to influence the demand that might exist for child labour. Thus, NDP growth (as we will see below) 
is likely to increase employment opportunities and in a rural economy, these are likely to be for 
relatively low-skilled farm jobs, which children can easily fill. It has often been argued that children 
are more likely to work on family farms than in industrial enterprises (Lieten, 2002; Bhalotra and 
Heady, 2003; Basu et al, 2003) and we have included the agricultural intensity of a state’s output in 
our analysis to capture this effect. 
 
Second, our analysis in this paper enables us to investigate whether macroeconomic growth may be 
expected to decrease child labour, as is often argued. With child labour being popularly considered 
to result from poverty, many policy makers, reviewing international evidence (see Table 1), argue 
that the best panacea for child labour is economic growth (see Weiner (1991) for the context in 
which this argument is put forward in India). Our results reject this straightforward conclusion. 
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They indicate that growth has an inverted U-shaped relationship with child labour wherein child 
labour initially increases with growth and subsequently declines. We will consider this pattern in 
the rest of this paper. 
 
Before we do this, we will consider the relationship between growth and child labour in more detail 
in the next section. 
 
THE GROWTH-CHILD LABOUR RELATIONSHIP: A CHILD LABOUR - KUZNETS 
CURVE? 
As mentioned above, economic growth will have an effect both on the demand for, and supply of, 
child labour. Any impact that it has on supply must work through its effect on household incomes, 
regional infrastructure and schooling facilities, all of which will influence the household’s 
motivation to send children out to work. To separate out this effect (on supply) from the impact that 
growth will have on the demand for labour, we include variables like average village wages, state 
NDP per capita and household incomes that will directly capture these supply side effects. Once the 
effect of these variables has been separated, we may expect that any residual impact that economic 
growth has will be through its impact on the demand for child workers rather than on their supply. 
Let us consider each of these in turn. 
 
To begin with, economic growth may be expected to increase household incomes either because it 
increases adult wage rates or because it creates more employment opportunities for adults. 
However, this effect will only hold if growth is pro-poor and if children are sent to work because of 
poverty to begin with
2
. Insofar as these two conditions hold, however, growth may be expected to 
decrease the supply of child workers to the labour market, an effect that will be mediated through 
household wages and incomes and therefore will be more directly captured by including them in our 
analysis.  
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It is possible that growth exerts two further influences on a family’s decision to send a child to 
school rather than to work. On the one hand, higher growth could imply a higher return to education 
increasing the incentive for parents to send their children to school. On the other hand, growth may 
also imply that future generations will be better off than the current generation. The current adults 
in a family may therefore want to shift resources back in time and child labour may be one way to 
achieve this
3
. 
 
In addition to its impact on household incomes, growth will also increase the level of NDP of a state 
and the latter will proxy for a number of supply side influences. First, a prosperous economy may 
be one which has strong and binding rules regarding child labour and schooling; rules which make 
it compulsory for children to be enrolled in school and more important, to attend school, once 
enrolled. Second, prosperity may create a socio-cultural environment in which children are seen not 
only as an economic asset but also in terms of their emotional and psychological contribution to the 
household. In this context, the quality of children becomes significant, leading parents to value 
school attendance. Third, prosperity may result in better infrastructure with regard to schools so that 
parents no longer feel that school is a waste of time or that their children are likely to benefit more 
in the long run from work experience (Grootaert and Patrinos, 1999; Dreze and Gazdar, 1996). 
Fourth, prosperity may help improve the socio-cultural environment so that school attendance 
becomes a norm rather than dependent on choices made by parents. All these factors will influence 
the supply of children to the labour market. In our analysis, these factors will be captured by 
average village wages and the level of NDP of the state in which the child lives.  
 
To summarise, we may say that the impact that growth has on the supply of children to the labour 
market will be mediated through the level of state NDP per capita (proxy for regional prosperity), 
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average village wages (proxy for village prosperity) and household income levels (proxy for 
household prosperity).  
 
However, this is only part of the story. Once the impact of growth on household and regional 
prosperity is allowed for, the residual impact of growth will be on the demand for child workers. As 
the economy grows, the labour demand curve will shift to the right both for adults and children. 
Initially, the jobs that become available, especially in the rural sector, will be low-skilled jobs. 
Eventually, however, as the economy continues to grow, the supply of low-skilled jobs dries up and 
sustained growth will result in an increase in high-skilled jobs both in the agricultural and industrial 
sectors. This, in turn, will increase the demand for schooling and decrease child employment. It is 
therefore expected that the impact of growth on the demand for child labour will be quadratic, with 
an initial increase in demand and a longer term decline. This growth-child labour relationship could 
be termed the child labour-Kuznets curve – an inverted U-shaped relationship wherein growth will 
initially increase child labour by increasing the opportunities for low skilled employment but will 
eventually lead to a shift towards more skilled workers. In this context, the pertinent question, of 
course, is the income level at which growth actually begins to decrease child labour.  
 
Our analysis so far leads us to conclude that the impact of economic growth on the supply of 
children to the labour market is likely to be linear and negative and to be captured in our 
specification by more proximate prosperity variables like NDP and village wages. The impact of 
growth on the demand for labour, on the other hand, is likely to be quadratic with a maximum. We 
therefore include growth and the square of growth in our model specification. It is possible that the 
initial impact of growth will be on increasing demand for child workers, especially in the context of 
extreme poverty. Over time, however, sustained growth will be reflected both in a decrease in 
demand for child workers (who are no longer sufficiently skilled) and in a decrease in the supply of 
such workers (because household incomes and regional prosperity improves). The net effect will 
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also be quadratic, with the initial increase in child work being followed by a decrease in the longer 
run. 
  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is considerable historical evidence in support of such a quadratic relationship. Thus, 
Heywood (1988) argues that ‘there is evidence, then, that the early phase of industrialisation, during 
the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, brought an increased reliance on child labour,’ (Heywood, 1988; p.132). 
The subsequent reversal in this trend is also clearly documented by historians, though the precise 
timing of this reversal is controversial. Nardinelli (1990), for instance, argues that while children 
under 13 years were 20% of the labour force in the cotton textile industry in 1816, they were only 
13.1% by 1835. Similarly, Heywood (1988) claims that while 30% of 10-14 year olds were 
employed in 1851, this had decreased to 17% by 1901. Such a pattern was common to most 
Western economies at the time. 
 
The reasons, both for the initial increase and later decline, in child labour participation rates in 
Great Britain have pre-occupied many researchers. Horrell and Humphries (1995) suggest that since 
child labour increased in those families where the father’s wages were also increasing, one must 
conclude that children worked where there were opportunities for such employment. And the 
opportunities to employ children did increase, at least initially, because ‘women and children are 
rendered more useful, and the latter more early useful, by manufacturing establishments, than they 
otherwise would be,’ (Alexander Hamilton quoted in Heywood, 1988: p.129). A similar point was 
made by Marx who argued that with the rise of new technology, especially machinery, ‘there is 
scope for employing those whose bodily development is incomplete and whose limbs are all the 
more supple,’ (Basu, 1999: p.372). In fact, Horrell and Humphries (1995) argue that in the initial 
stages of growth, families were often constrained to supply less child labour than they considered 
optimal. With growth, such constraints were loosened and families were able to access a wider 
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range of livelihood options. Child work therefore increased. Over time, however, an increase in 
adult wages and living standards, the success of regulation (e.g. the Factory Acts), compulsory 
schooling, income growth and other factors all helped to decrease child labour in Britain. 
 
Swaminathan (1998) in a study of a prosperous and fast growing region of India – Gujarat - finds 
that child labour has increased. The study relies on detailed primary evidence and Swaminathan 
does not attempt to test the strength of the relationship formally. Cigno, Rosatti and Guaracello 
(2002), analysing the impact of globalisation on child labour using a large sample of developing 
countries, find that the problem is not so much globalisation or trade exposure as being allowed to 
take part in trade. Kak (2004) considering the relationship between the level of development of 
Indian states and the incidence of child labour amongst 10-14 year olds, clearly concludes that it is 
not a ‘monolithic or linear relationship’. In fact, a simple correlation coefficient (calculated from 
Kak’s own figures) of the proportion of rural (10-14 year old) boys in the labour force and the HDI 
rank of the state is 0.2181. This is low and confirms his argument that the level of development is 
only one factor determining the extent of child labour in a state. Torres (nd), however, analysing the 
relationship between a country’s growth and its child labour at a macroeconomic level, finds that an 
increase in growth leads to a decrease in child labour. 
 
Grootaert and Patrinos (1999) argue that ‘primitive technology can create situations in which adults 
cannot substitute for children.’ This includes boys used in mine tunnels that are too small for adults 
to crawl through or used as chimney sweeps. In this context, changes in technology helped to 
decrease child labour. In their analysis of child labour in a number of countries, Grootaert and 
Patrinos (1999) include regional dummies as a weak proxy for demand side factors.  
 
Kak (2004), in a study of child labour in India, tries to explain the ‘persistence of child labour in a 
period when unemployment levels for adult workers are increasing’. He argues that the demand for 
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children in the labour market occurs not because of labour shortages but because of the 
characteristics of the labour market which is segmented by caste, gender and class divisions and 
‘which provide distinct spheres for participation of children in the labour force’ (Kak, 2004, p.46). 
‘Children – working in fields, or grazing cattle, winnowing paddy – are not only an extra hand for 
their families but also relieve the adult labour to seek employment away from villages’ (Kak, 2004, 
p.45). In this context, Chandrasekhar (1997) argues that an abolition of child labour is likely to lead 
to an increase in adult wage rates.  
 
Myron Weiner (1991), in a break from the rest of the literature, argues that child labour in India 
arises not so much from India’s low per capita income and poor economic situation, as from a ‘set 
of beliefs, that are widely shared by educators, social activists, trade unionists, academic researchers 
and more broadly, members of the Indian middle class’ that education is a means of maintaining 
differentiation amongst the social classes and excessive and inappropriate education for the poor 
would disrupt existing social arrangements’ (p.5). Weiner articulates the official Indian position – 
that as employment and incomes increase, it will no longer be necessary for the poor to send 
children to work or that as technology changes, the demand for unskilled workers will decrease and 
therefore parents will send children to school (p.13). In a detailed socio-political study, Weiner 
concludes that such explanations ‘do not stand up against historical and comparative evidence’ 
(p.14) from other countries. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data 
The data for our analysis are from the 50th round of the household socio-economic survey 
conducted by the National Sample Survey Organisation in India. The dataset is large and complex, 
and covers all the states and Union Territories in India. It includes socio-economic information for 
356,352 individuals belonging to 69,231 households in rural India. Since this round of the survey 
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was focussed on consumer expenditure and employment and Schedule 10 itself concentrates on 
education and employment issues, we have detailed information on the educational status and 
economic activity of members of each of the households in the survey for 1993. The dataset thus 
provides us with exhaustive information on the work and schooling status of children in these 
households, and the educational and employment status of their parents. For the macro variables, 
we used a variety of sources including the Economic Survey and the Dutt and Ravallion data from 
the World Bank web site. 
 
Children in this study have been defined as those between 5-15 years of age, a definition that 
conforms to the less-strict definition put forward by the ILO and UNICEF
4
 (ILO, 1996). Since the 
paper focuses on child labour, the under-5 category was not considered. This provides us with a 
sample of 93,825 children around whom the analysis in this paper is concentrated. Tables 1a and 1b 
in Appendix 1 provide summary statistics of the binary variables (Appendix 1a) and continuous 
variables (Appendix 1b) used in the analysis in this paper. The statistics indicate that 65% of 
children state their principal activity as going to school (SCHOOL = 1) and 7.14% as Work. 46.4% 
of the sample children are girls and the average age of children in the sample is 9.77 years.  
 
Though the data from the NSS is rich and comprehensive, as far as such household data sources go, 
some limitations with regard to their measures for child work need to be kept in mind. In the rural 
sample that is the concern in this paper, the tasks undertaken by children are likely to be highly 
seasonal and can be undertaken together with schooling. Therefore, there is some ambiguity when 
the principal and secondary activity status of children is being recorded (Kak, 2004, p.50). In 
addition, of course, the work done by girls within the household is much harder to determine 
precisely. There is also likely to be some under-reporting of child work because of attempts to take 
advantage of the mid-day meal scheme in schools (Kak, 2004). 
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India provides a good example with which to test the effects of growth and development on child 
labour because the initial level of incomes as well as the growth of these incomes varies across 
states. Equally important, the levels of development also vary significantly across states. Thus, there 
are states like Kerala, which have relatively high levels of human development. On the other hand, 
there are states like Bihar and Madhya Pradesh where the levels of human development are 
significantly lower. Before we go any further, let us look at the regional spread of child labour in 
India. 
Insert Table 2 here. 
The above table indicates that child labour is highest in Andhra Pradesh and lowest in Kerala. 
Surprisingly, we find that the poorer states (Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (UP)) also have relatively low 
rates of child labour participation. Looking further, we find that some states like Tamil Nadu have 
both high child work and high child schooling participation whereas others (Bihar, MP) with low 
child work have low schooling figures too. In these states, therefore, low child labour seems to 
reflect ‘low opportunity’.  
 
Methodology 
To consider the impact of economic growth on the probability of a child being employed, we 
analyse the determinants of work and schooling within a standard bivariate probit model. Within 
this framework, SCHOOL and WORK are our two binary dependent variables and they are 
specified according to the principal activity status of the child (see Appendix 1). Child work is said 
to occur when the principal activity of the child refers to any one of those activities, which are 
categorised as ‘employed’ within the data. Here the dependent variable WORK is coded 1 if the 
child is working, else is coded 0. When the principal activity of the child refers to attending 
educational institutions the child is categorised as going to School. Here the dependent variable 
SCHOOL is equal to 1 if the child is going to school, else is coded 0. This classification is based on 
self-reporting of activities
5
. 
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Although our primary concern in this paper is the influence of regional growth and development on 
the probability of child work, we control for a number of personal characteristics (including age and 
sex of the child) and household characteristics (like mother’s and father’s education and 
employment status, household religion, landownership and debt status). The definition of each of 
the variables included in the model is in Appendix 1. We will therefore not describe these variables 
in much detail in what follows.  
 
Personal and Household Characteristics 
We include age (AGE) and the square of age (AGE
2
) of the child in both equations. We expect that 
as children grow older, they are more likely to participate in the labour market. We also include Sex 
(0=boys) in our model. In general, it is expected that girls are less likely to be involved in economic 
activity than boys but also less likely to participate in schooling. This is because girls are more 
likely to be involved in domestic chores than boys and spend a significant proportion of their time 
in such activities. While analysing these activities of girls is beyond the scope of this paper, they 
have been analysed in some detail by Kambhampati and Rajan (2004b). In this paper, we 
concentrate on the market activity of girls rather than on domestic work, whilst accepting that this 
will provide an incomplete picture of their work loads. Since preliminary tests indicate that it is not 
only the work participation rates that vary across boys and girls but also the determinants of such 
work, we estimate the model separately for boys and girls.  
 
In addition to the variables capturing the child’s personal characteristics, we include a number of 
variables that allow for mother’s and father’s characteristics. Thus, we include father’s and 
mother’s education into our model as 3 separate binary variables, each representing different levels 
of education - primary, secondary and tertiary – EDUPRI, EDUSEC and EDUTER. In general, it is 
expected that better educated parents have greater ability and incentive to improve their children’s 
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education and therefore are less likely to send them to work at an early age. Summary statistics (see 
Appendix 1) indicate that 14% of fathers in our sample have primary education, 11% have 
secondary education and only 3% have tertiary education. Amongst mothers, the proportion who 
are educated is lower – 7.4% have primary education, 5% have secondary education and less than 
0.6% have tertiary education. 
 
The literature also argues that the employment status of parents is important. It has been argued that 
mothers who are employed (MOTHER_WORK) are likely to be more broad-minded about their 
daughter’s employment and education prospects than those working only within the household. 
There is, however, some disagreement regarding this, with some evidence (see Basu, 1993) that 
working mothers are more likely to withdraw their daughters from school so that they can help at 
home and outside. To consider these effects, we include two variables (FATHER_WORK and 
MOTHER_WORK) reflecting the mother’s and father’s employment status into our model. While 
91% of fathers stated that they worked more or less regularly (FATHER_WORK), less than 35% of 
mother’s claim to work regularly (MOTHER_WORK) (see Appendix 1).  
 
Other variables that are included in our model are dummies for religion, social group, household 
debt and landownership. HINDU and MUSLIM are categorical variables that identify Hindu 
households and Muslim households relative to all others. With Hindu children being 84% of our 
sample (see Appendix 1), the non-Hindu category (including Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Jains, 
Buddhists, Zoroastrians and others) is approximately 16%. On the other hand, the non-Muslim 
category is 89% (and includes Hindus and the other non-Muslim religions mentioned above). We 
also include the social group of the household (SOCGROUP), which is 1 if the household belongs 
to a scheduled caste or tribe and is zero otherwise. Approximately 27.8% of children within our 
sample belong to scheduled caste and tribes (see Appendix 1). We would generally expect that 
schooling would be less amongst these groups and work would be higher.  
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Household debt (DEBT) is included to see whether households that are in debt are more likely to 
send their children out to work or not. Many studies argue that cash flow problems provide the 
initial catalyst for households to send children out to work. However, once this is done, they find it 
hard to reverse the decision. Our summary statistics (Appendix 1) indicate that 11.6% of children 
live in households that hold some debt. We also include a variable that identifies households which 
own land relative to those that do not (LAND). It has long been argued that land ownership 
(LAND) can have conflicting effects on child work – on the one hand increasing the opportunities 
for child employment (i.e. the demand for child workers) and on the other, increasing household 
wealth and therefore decreasing child employment (Bhalotra and Heady, 2003) i.e. the supply of 
child workers. In the context of the girl child, however, it could also reflect a relatively conservative 
feudal environment (Admassie, 2003) in which girls are more likely to be retained at home rather 
than sent out either to work or to study. Landowning households are likely to be more patriarchal 
than others. Appendix 1 indicates that approximately 96.6% of our sample children live in 
households that own some land. 
 
Finally, we include parent labour income [mother’s + father’s wages] in our School and Work 
equations as the variable PARWAGE. On average, weekly parental wage within our sample is 
Rs.93.4 and the standard deviation of this wage is Rs.190.5. Given the luxury axiom, this variable 
might be expected to significantly influence the supply of child labour. We hypothesise that the 
higher are the wage variables, the higher is the probability that children go to school rather than 
work. In addition to this wage variable, we also include a variable (OTHINCOM) that captures all 
the other sources of household income. This variable is included to allow for incomes earned by the 
family from non-labour sources. It can be significant in cases where parents work but do not earn an 
income because they work in a family enterprise, for example. It can also be significant where the 
family earns significant rental or other income. This variable is total monthly household 
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expenditure
6
 minus PARWAGE minus child wages. The summary statistics in Appendix 1 indicate 
that this is a major part of the household’s income. While the parent’s wage income is Rs.93.34 per 
week on average, OTHINCOM is Rs.1846.17 per month (i.e. Rs.461.54 per week). 
 
Prosperity, Growth and Child Labour  
In addition to the above personal and household characteristics, we include a number of variables 
that reflect the prosperity of the region that the child lives in. These include the NDP of the state, 
average village wages, the growth rate of the state, the pro-poorness of its growth and the 
proportion of NDP contributed by agriculture. Let us look at each of these in turn.  
 
SNDP is the state’s NDP per capita and is expected to proxy the prosperity of the state. Since we 
have included household income separately, the state NDP per capita will allow for the fact that the 
very poor in a poor state are doubly disadvantaged – both because they are poor and because they 
live in a poor state. As indicated earlier, it will reflect the infrastructural and institutional 
arrangements in a state and therefore will influence the supply of child labour. We also include 
average village-level wages (VILPROS) into our model to proxy for village prosperity. This 
variable is calculated from within our sample and is the only village level variable for which we 
have information. The higher are village wages, the more prosperous the village and the lower the 
probability of child labour in such villages. Our summary statistics (Appendix 1) indicate that the 
average weekly village wage within our sample is Rs.132.48, with a standard deviation of Rs.94.86. 
 
The distributive impact of growth on the poorest households is captured by the PRO-POOR 
variable. As indicated earlier, one of the factors that might determine whether growth increases or 
decreases child work could be the extent to which the benefits of this growth are equitably 
distributed. The pro-poor variable proxies for this by taking the average decrease in poverty for 
every 1% increase in NDP across the country (calculated by Datt and Ravallion, 1998). We then 
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calculate the actual reduction in poverty per 1% of growth in each state. The PRO-POOR variable 
is the difference between the actual reduction in poverty in each state and the average reduction 
across India for every 1% of growth. States that were above the All-India average were considered 
to be pro-poor because their growth had a larger impact on decreasing poverty as compared to the 
Indian average. Thus, this variable, together with the level of NDP per capita will capture the 
impact that growth has on the supply of child labour.  
 
On the demand side we include the rate of growth of NDP (GROWTH) in each state. As indicated 
earlier, the impact that economic growth may have on the supply of child labour works through 
state NDP per capita and household incomes, which have been included separately in our model. In 
this specification, therefore, the growth of NDP may be expected to influence only the demand for 
child labour. Initially, an increase in economic growth is likely to shift the labour demand curve to 
the right and therefore to increase employment opportunities both for adults and children. 
Households that were previously constrained by the availability of jobs will now be able to send 
their children out to work. Over time, however, we expect that sustained increases in growth will 
lead to an increase in the demand for skilled labour and a decrease in the demand for unskilled 
children in the labour market. This will result in an inverted U-shaped relationship between growth 
and child labour. We therefore include growth as a quadratic term, to capture both the initial 
increase and the later decrease. Average state-level growth rates in our sample are 62.4% over the 
period 1982-1992, with a minimum of 37.81% in Bihar and a maximum of 97% in Rajasthan (see 
Appendix 1).  
 
In an alternative specification (see Table 6), we also include growth interactively with NDP to allow 
for the fact that the impact of growth will be different in states with low, medium and high NDP. 
Thus, it is possible that growth in low NDP states will cause an increase in demand for child labour, 
while in high NDP states, growth may increase the demand for skilled adult labour but not for 
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children. The variables (GROWTH*NDPL, GROWTH*NDPM, and GROWTH*NDPH) in the 
estimations in Table 6 are growth interacted with low, medium and high NDP respectively. Growth 
in low NDP states (GROWTH*NDPL) is 23.85%, while it is 24.05% in medium NDP states 
(GROWTH*NDPM) and 14.5% in high NDP states (GROWTH*NDPH) (see Appendix 1). 
However, the need to impose discrete cut-off points for high, medium and low NDP states makes 
these results more prone to bias than those in Table 3. We therefore concentrate on the results in 
Table 3 in the next section though a quick look confirms that the results from this specification are 
very similar to our main specification, further reinforcing the robustness of our main results.  
 
Another variable that is likely to influence the demand for children in the rural labour market is the 
proportion of agriculture in the state’s NDP (PROAGRI). Children in rural areas are often 
employed on family farms because labour requirements in this sector are both casual and seasonal. 
In-family child workers fulfil both requirements while also decreasing the supervision required and 
therefore decreasing the moral hazard problems in agriculture (Bhalotra and Heady, 2003). 
Admassie (2003) has found a strong positive correlation between the incidence of child labour and 
agriculture’s share in NDP. He argues that ‘backward and labour intensive’ production processes 
(like agriculture) are especially intensive in their use of child labour. In 1991, 46% of rural child 
workers in India were engaged as agricultural labourers. According to the 1991 Census, around 
42% of children worked on their family farm in agriculture and in animal husbandry and fishing 
respectively (Lieten, 2002). Overall therefore we may expect this variable to increase the demand 
for child workers
7
. Across the 15 states that we include in our analysis, the proportion that 
agriculture contributes to state NDP is 32.6% on average, with a minimum of 18.4% in Maharastra 
and a maximum of 45.3% in Punjab. 
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DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Our results indicate that there is a significant difference in the factors influencing the probability of 
employment of boys and girls. The likelihood ratio test of this difference gives a calculated chi-
square statistic of 1582.96, which is highly significant and leads us to reject the hypothesis that the 
same model could explain the probability of employment of both boys and girls. We therefore 
present the separate results and discuss the differences as we go along.  
Insert Table 3 
Though the results for both schooling and work are presented, our discussion will concentrate only 
on the factors influencing the probability of work. From time to time, of course, we will consider 
the results for schooling because they help confirm patterns with child employment. We will also 
consider both the coefficients and marginal effects of the estimates that we have obtained (see 
Table3).  
 
As indicated earlier, personal and household characteristics will in general influence the supply of 
labour, as will certain macro variables like village wages (VILPROS), the state’s NDP per capita 
(SNDP) and the pro-poorness of growth (PRO-POOR). Other factors like the rate of growth of NDP 
(GROWTH) and the agricultural intensity of the state’s output (PROAGRI) are hypothesised as 
more likely to influence the demand for child workers. We will discuss these in turn.  
 
The probability of working for both boys and girls initially increases with age (AGE) though at a 
decreasing rate. Our results indicate that Muslim (MUSLIM) boys and girls work less than those 
from other religions. While the marginal effect for Muslim boys is very close to that of Hindu boys 
(-0.03), that for Hindu girls is significantly higher than for Muslim girls. We can therefore conclude 
that the probability of work for Hindu and Muslim boys is very similar but, surprisingly, the 
probability of work for Hindu girls is higher than for girls from other religions. Interestingly, we 
find that both Hindu and Muslim girls have a lower probability of going to school than their 
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brothers. Our results also indicate that children from scheduled castes and tribes (SOCGRP = 1) 
have a higher probability of being employed than children from other social groups. Once again, the 
magnitude of this coefficient for boys is double (0.024) that of girls (0.012). 
 
As expected, father’s and mother’s education at all stages - primary, secondary and tertiary 
(FEDUPRIM, FEDUSEC, FEDUTER & MEDUPRIM, MEDUSEC, MEDUTER) - decreases the 
probability of both boys and girls working. The only exception to this is mother’s tertiary education, 
which has an insignificant impact on the probability of work for children. We see that the 
relationship is clearly increasing monotonically. Thus, while the marginal effect of primary 
education of fathers on girl’s work is 0.007, the marginal effect of secondary education is 0.022 and 
of tertiary education is 0.027 indicating that as the level of father’s education increases, girl’s 
employment decreases monotonically. This is true, and more significantly so, for boys. The effect 
of an increase in mother’s education is less clearcut. Mother’s education clearly decreases the 
probability of employment of both boys and girls. However, for boys, the impact of mother’s 
primary education is particularly large (a marginal effect of -0.068) as opposed to secondary 
education (-0.055). For girls, both the primary and secondary education of mothers is significant (-
0.029 and -0.034 respectively).  
 
While mother’s employment (MOTHER_WORK) significantly increases the probability of 
daughter’s employment, it has no significant impact on the probability of boy’s employment. This 
complementarity between mother’s work and daughter’s employment has been commented on 
elsewhere in the literature (Ray, 2000; Kambhampati and Rajan, 2004b). Father’s employment 
(FATHER_WORK), on the other hand, does not particularly influence the probability of work for 
either boys or girls.  
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We find that an increase in parent’s wage earnings (PARWAGE) decreases the employment of both 
boys and girls. The marginal effect is larger for boys (-0.0001) than for girls (-0.00003). While 
these coefficients may seem small, they indicate that an increase in parent wages by Rs.100 would 
decrease the probability of boy’s employment by 1% and of girl’s work by 0.03%. This finding 
clearly confirms the luxury axiom in our sample. We also find that an increase in OTHINCOM of 
Rs.100 decreases the probability of both boy’s and girl’s work by 0.1% approximately. Overall 
therefore, our results relating to wages and incomes confirm the luxury axiom – households would 
not send their children out to work if the income from non-child labour sources was sufficiently 
high (Kambhampati and Rajan, 2004a). 
 
Impact of Macroeconomic Prosperity 
Turning now to the impact of the macroeconomic variables on the probability of child labour, we 
find that as expected, the probability of child employment is lower in states with higher NDPs 
(SNDP). The marginal effect for girls is larger than that for boys leading us to conclude that the 
externality effect of a prosperous environment has a pronounced impact on child work. As 
discussed earlier, this might be because greater prosperity may be associated with better 
infrastructure, compulsory schooling, better schools and/or a more progressive socio-cultural 
environment in which schooling is a norm. At a more localised level, we find that an increase in 
average weekly village wage (VILPROS) by Rs.100 decreases the probability of employment for 
boys by 2% and of girls by 1%. 
 
We hypothesised that it is not so much the level of macroeconomic output as changes in this output 
that are relevant for the prospects of child labour. We therefore included both growth in NDP 
(GROWTH) and the pro-poorness of this growth (PRO-POOR) into our analysis. Our results 
indicate that, as hypothesised, growth has a strong and significant quadratic effect on the probability 
of work both for boys and for girls. Once again, however, it increases the probability of 
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employment of boys more (a marginal effect of 0.011) than of girls (0.009). Thus, a 1% increase in 
growth increases the probability of employment of girls and boys by approximately 1%. Our results 
confirm that the probability of employment first increases and then decreases, confirming a Kuznets 
type relationship. Households in India seem to be demand-constrained in the amount of 
employment that their children undertake. An increase in growth rates lifts this constraint and draws 
more children into the labour market. Only when this is sustained over time will it result in a 
decrease in the employment of children.  
 
Our results also indicate that the pro-poorness of growth (PRO-POOR) does not significantly 
influence the probability of employment of boys. For girls, however, pro-poor growth actually 
increases the probability of employment quite significantly. This is surprising because we would 
expect that when growth is pro-poor it would help to decrease child employment. From our results, 
however, it seems to be the case that when growth is pro-poor, the opportunities for employment 
increase because the opportunities are well-distributed and this increases the employment of girls.  
 
The other macroeconomic demand variable that we included was the agricultural intensity of 
production of state NDP (PROAGRI). We expected this to increase child employment because there 
are more opportunities for the casual employment of children on farms. Our results are extremely 
interesting. We find that the probability of employment of boys increases significantly in 
agricultural states reinforcing the findings of Lieten (2002). However, the probability of 
employment of girls decreases significantly, reinforcing the argument of Admassie (2003) that 
agricultural regions or households are likely to be more conservative regarding the role played by 
girls/women. Our results also indicate that children have a higher probability of being employed in 
the more rural and agricultural states reinforcing the argument that rural activities provide more 
opportunities for the employment of children (Lieten, 2002).  
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Predicted Probabilities 
By State 
Our main aim in this paper was to consider whether differences in growth and development across 
Indian states are reflected in child labour participation rates in these states. In this section, we will 
consider how the estimates of the probability of child labour vary across states in India, by 
calculating the probabilities predicted by our model when holding each variable at its state-level 
average (see Table 4).  
Insert Table 4 
We find that the average probability of child work across states in India is 0.026 for both boys and 
girls. The probability is higher for boys (0.028) than for girls (0.020), as expected. Considering the 
states separately, we find that Rajasthan has the highest probability (at 0.072), followed by Orissa 
(0.042). States such as Kerala (0.005), Punjab (0.009), Bihar (0.016) and Maharashtra (0.018) have 
the lowest probabilities. At first glance, these results are surprising because Bihar (a relatively low-
development state) emerges as one with relatively low child labour. This confirms our earlier 
argument that there are two possible low child labour positions, one associated with a relatively 
‘developed’ economy like that of Kerala and the other with an economy that is much less 
prosperous and developed. In the former, low child labour occurs because households are well-off 
and opportunities for education exist. In the latter, low child labour occurs because even though 
households are poor, economic opportunities for employment are few. In the latter case, currently 
existing rates of child labour are demand-constrained rates, implying that the unconstrained figures 
may be significantly higher than these rates. This is further reinforced by the fact that schooling 
probability in low child labour states like Bihar and Orissa is also very low, indicating that these 
really are the ‘low opportunity’ states. 
 
Considering Kerala and Bihar in more detail, we find that the probability of work for boys is higher 
in Bihar (0.024) than in Kerala (0.008) though the probability of employment for girls is very 
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similar in the two states. What makes Kerala (a high development state) different from Bihar (a low 
development state) is the probability of child schooling. In Kerala, the probability of child schooling 
is 0.898 and it is higher for girls (0.904) than for boys (0.898). In Bihar, on the other hand, the 
overall probability of child schooling (0.539) is much lower and the probability for girls is 0.387, 
the lowest in India. Thus, while both states have similar levels of child employment, this arises from 
very different circumstances. It therefore leads us to conclude that while further growth is likely to 
decrease child labour in Kerala, it may well increase child labour in Bihar at least in the first 
instance. 
 
Analysing the probabilities separately for boys and girls, we find that the lowest probability for 
girl’s work is in Punjab (0.001) and the highest probability is in Rajasthan (0.102). The highest 
probability predicted by our model for boy’s employment is in Orissa (0.046) and Karnataka 
(0.040) while the lowest probability is in Kerala (0.008) and Tamil Nadu (0.000). 
 
By Variable 
We now consider the impact that an increase (or decrease) in variables reflecting macroeconomic 
prosperity would have on the probability of child work. Thus, we consider the impact that having a 
certain level of NDP, growth or the proportion of agricultural output in the state’s NDP, for 
instance, would have on child employment. Our results are presented in Table 5. 
Insert Table 5 
Table 5 clearly indicates that if all states in India were to grow as fast as the fastest growing state, 
then the probability of child labour more than doubles (to 0.063). This leads us to conclude that the 
existing child labour participation in India is constrained by demand (rather than supply) side 
factors. As growth increases and loosens the demand side constraint, more and more families take 
the opportunity to send their children out to work. The probability of girl’s employment increases 
from 0.02 to 0.103 and that of boy’s employment from 0.028 to 0.033. It would take a considerable 
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increase in growth to raise incomes sufficiently to decrease supply of children to the labour market. 
This can perhaps be seen from the effect that higher NDP would have on child employment.  
 
Looking at Table 5, we find that if average NDP across the country were to increase to the level of 
the richest state (Punjab), then the probability of child work would decrease to one-third that of the 
current all-India average (0.008 as against 0.026) while the probability for girls would decrease to 
one-tenth (0.002). Again, the more than proportionate decrease in girl’s employment relative to 
boys is evident from our results. If NDP were to be held at the level of the poorest state (Bihar), the 
probability of child labour almost doubles from 0.026 to 0.046. 
 
In the states where agriculture makes a larger contribution to the economy (Punjab), the probability 
of child employment (0.036) is more than the Indian average. When the agricultural intensity of 
production is lowest, the probability of work decreases to 0.018. We also note that the probability of 
employment of girls in agriculture-intensive states is below the average probability across the 
country (i.e. 0.019 as opposed to 0.020), while the probability of employment of boys in 
agricultural states is higher than their all-India average (0.036). Pro-poor growth increases the 
probability of work for girls (to 0.023) above the general average.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have considered the impact that macroeconomic growth and development may 
have on the probability of child labour within households. Our analysis brings together data from 
schedule 10 of the 50
th
 Round of the 1993 National Sample Survey of India and state level macro 
data from various sources. Our main concern was to test popular wisdom -- that improved growth 
would decrease child labour. We test this by estimating a bivariate probit model to analyse the 
probability of work and schooling for boys and girls across 15 states in India. 
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Our results lead us to conclude that contrary to popular wisdom, growth actually increases rather 
than decreases child labour. It is only when growth is sustained that it might help to decrease the 
supply of child labour sufficiently to offset the impact of increased demand. Our results therefore 
lead us to trace out a child-labour Kuznets curve.  We interpret this as the impact of growth on the 
demand for child workers. Another factor influencing the demand for child workers (the agricultural 
intensity of state NDP) is also found to be significant. The level of state NDP, village wages and 
household incomes are all highly significant and decrease the probability of child work. These 
variables are seen as the conduits through which growth influences the supply side of the child 
labour market. Contrary to expectations, the pro-poorness of growth also seems to increase the 
probability of work, especially for girls.  
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END NOTES 
 
1
 This is often considered to be an underestimate with official figures not fully reflecting reality. 
2
 Alternatively, if families send children out to work because the returns to education are low, then 
even if growth increases household incomes, it is unlikely to significantly decrease the number of 
children working in an economy. 
3
 We are grateful to one of the referees of this paper for this point. 
4
 ILO conventions recommend a minimum age for admission to employment or work that must not 
be less than the age for completing compulsory schooling, and in any case not less than 15 years. 
Lower ages are permitted - generally in countries where economic and educational facilities are less 
well-developed. The minimum age is 14 years and 13 years for 'light work'. On the other hand the 
minimum age for hazardous work is higher at 18 years. 
5
 Children who work and study or who do household chores and work are classified either within 
work or within school, depending on which they claim as their primary activity. Such a 
classification is useful because it enables us to consider the child’s primary activities in binary 
terms. However, it does not allow us to consider children who are multi-tasking. This does not seem 
to be a major problem in our sample because summary statistics indicate that a majority of the 
children (85% of boys and 71% of girls) who did some work worked full time i.e. 7 days a week. 
6
 We use total household expenditure rather than household income as income tends to be rather 
unreliable in such surveys. People are less willing to indicate what their income is, often incomes in 
kind are excluded. Household expenditure also provides a ‘lifecycle measure’ of the household’s 
income. 
7
 As indicated earlier, we also included the household’s land ownership as a separate variable. This 
captures the supply and demand aspects from a household point of view whereas the state 
agricultural proportion reflects demand for child workers in the economy more generally 
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Table 1: Trends in Labour Participation Rates of Children (10-14 year olds) 
Region 1950 2000 
World 27.49 11.24 
Africa 38.6 24.98 
Latin America and Caribbean 19.39 8.21 
Asia 36.05 10.2 
Europe 6.5 0.03 
North America 1.63 0 
Oceania 12.12 4.66 
India 35.43 12.07 
China 47.85 7.86 
Source: ILO, Labour Statistics, 2004. 
 
 
Table 2: Macroeconomic Performance and Child Labour Participation Rates 
Across States in India, 1993 
 States 
 State 
Per 
Capita 
NDP 
(1992)
a 
 Growth Rate 
(1982-93)
b
 
 Poverty 
Reduction 
c
 
% of children in work 
(1994)
d 
% of children in school 
(1994)
e 
 
   All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
ANDHRA PRADESH 7650.8 32.22 -3.68 17.27 18.16 16.32 60.84 68.49 53.05 
BIHAR 4275.0 12.74 -1.96 4.11 5.66 2.05 54.36 62.84 43.10 
GUJARAT 11708.1 53.48 -3.7 5.92 7.40 4.28 67.37 74.51 59.44 
HARYANA 12085.0 36.00 -4.03 2.38 3.66 0.88 75.20 81.92 67.38 
KARNATAKA 8260.2 43.85 -1.1 11.55 12.87 10.20 69.38 74.37 64.23 
KERALA 8132.1 32.80 -4.06 0.92 0.95 0.89 93.77 93.56 93.98 
MADHYA PRADESH 6988.3 21.19 -1.68 8.70 10.68 6.30 56.03 64.06 46.30 
MAHARASHTRA 12573.5 54.82 -1.75 6.57 6.45 6.70 79.05 83.68 73.88 
ORISSA 5163.5 28.00 -3.17 7.37 9.60 4.94 63.94 69.58 57.80 
PUNJAB 13770.5 35.08 -4.03 4.28 7.24 0.80 76.55 80.55 71.84 
RAJASTHAN 7715.9 53.88 -1.25 12.68 9.41 16.71 56.11 73.22 34.95 
TAMILNADU 9287.3 54.02 -2.33 11.14 9.63 12.76 78.45 82.84 73.74 
UTTAR PRADESH 5892.3 20.42 -2.08 4.59 6.20 2.61 61.08 71.13 48.79 
WEST BENGAL 7101.2 34.68 -2.24 4.92 7.17 2.53 66.98 70.35 63.39 
Source:          
a 
Per Capita State Domestic product at constant prices (SNDP) figures are computed from Datt and Ravalion , World 
Bank Data Base 
b
 Simple Growth rate of states over a period of 10 years (1982-92) at constant prices using data from Datt and 
Ravallion, World Bank Data Base 
 
c 
Poverty Reduction has been computed using (Datt & Ravallion, 1998)  
d,e 
Computed from NSSO data 
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Table 3: Results for Child Schooling & Work: All, Boys and Girls 
 Model Results Marginal Effects 
 ALL BOYS GIRLS All Boys Girls 
|Variable 
 
Coefficient   t-ratio 
 
Coefficient   t-ratio 
 
Coefficient   t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
                          
SCHOOL                         
Constant -3.129 -25.410 -3.812 -22.167 -3.114 -17.393 0  0   0  
AGE 0.679 54.508 0.797 45.989 0.593 32.333 0.259 59.680 0.263 50.381 0.249 34.683 
AGE2 -0.035 -55.353 -0.039 -45.102 -0.032 -34.884 -0.013 -58.025 -0.012 -46.768 -0.013 -36.330 
PERSEX -0.491 -39.032         -0.190 -42.979     
FEDUPRI 0.120 7.239 0.155 6.376 0.115 4.900 0.036 6.641 0.037 5.568 0.042 4.776 
FEDUSEC 0.396 18.834 0.407 12.984 0.409 14.003 0.118 19.599 0.095 13.446 0.146 14.518 
FEDUTER 0.570 13.848 0.527 8.529 0.631 11.261 0.159 16.293 0.116 9.816 0.213 13.122 
FATHER_WORK 0.148 8.317 0.145 5.865 0.162 6.168 0.052 8.091 0.046 5.944 0.064 6.124 
MEDUPRI 0.307 11.287 0.308 7.671 0.274 7.066 0.089 10.966 0.070 7.302 0.096 6.885 
MEDUSEC 0.583 15.512 0.562 9.917 0.567 10.696 0.163 18.260 0.126 11.865 0.193 11.910 
MEDUTER 0.440 4.065 0.520 3.187 0.343 2.272 0.127 4.484 0.115 3.695 0.120 2.343 
MOTHER_WORK 0.103 3.486 0.205 4.642 0.041 0.985 0.040 4.171 0.058 5.389 0.025 1.611 
HINDU -0.038 -1.198 0.091 2.023 -0.145 -3.227 -0.015 -1.401 0.019 1.440 -0.052 -3.064 
MUSLIM -0.394 -10.915 -0.329 -6.401 -0.457 -8.772 -0.155 -11.215 -0.112 -6.380 -0.184 -9.099 
SOCGRP -0.330 -25.841 -0.335 -18.872 -0.336 -17.774 -0.113 -24.447 -0.100 -18.060 -0.129 -17.271 
DEBT -0.164 -9.681 -0.157 -6.736 -0.173 -6.827 -0.054 -8.816 -0.045 -6.216 -0.064 -6.355 
FEMILIT -0.200 -9.454 -0.074 -3.261 -0.696 -13.976 -0.074 -9.462 -0.023 -3.207 -0.278 -13.979 
MALEILI -0.360 -28.793 -0.360 -15.514 -0.304 -19.178 -0.133 -28.753 -0.117 -15.535 -0.122 -19.174 
LAND 0.046 1.465 0.060 1.323 0.047 1.008 0.015 1.352 0.018 1.342 0.016 0.907 
PARWAGE1 0.000359 9.389 0.00028 4.864 0.00045 8.732 0.000 8.005 .57D04 3.338 0.000 8.362 
OTHINCOM 0.000104 32.176 0.00011 24.774 0.00010 23.037 .34D04 28.928 .30D04 21.870 .38D04 21.210 
DEP 1.035 14.884 0.763 7.858 1.457 14.151 0.360 15.198 0.220 8.011 0.575 14.466 
VILPROS 0.001 14.764 0.001 8.761 0.001 12.551 0.000 13.616 0.000 7.629 0.000 12.161 
PCNDP92 0.000004 10.074 0.0000035 5.435 0.0000058 9.006 .13D05 8.691 .92D06 4.969 .19D05 7.665 
GROWTH 0.026 8.962 0.009 2.166 0.046 10.868 0.011 11.184 0.005 3.962 0.020 12.134 
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GROWTH2 0.00021 -10.160 -0.00005 -1.751 -0.00039 -12.892 -0.84D04 -11.870 -0.28D04 -3.366 0.000 -13.757 
PROAGRI -0.017 -15.555 -0.006 -3.867 -0.029 -18.399 -0.006 -15.419 -0.001 -3.373 -0.012 -18.948 
PRO-POOR 0.029 3.560 0.015 1.278 0.038 3.235 0.011 3.768 0.004 1.186 0.016 3.521 
WORK                         
Constant -5.012 -20.480 -4.123 -13.660 -6.455 -15.914 0  0   0  
AGE 0.206 6.556 0.085 2.127 0.406 8.002 0.098 24.735 0.1410 20.687 0.073 16.709 
AGE2 0.002 1.695 0.009 5.086 -0.008 -3.739 -0.003 -14.156 -0.0035 -10.917 -0.002 -11.928 
PERSEX -0.194 -11.211         -0.081 -18.656     
FEDUPRI -0.175 -7.642 -0.222 -7.338 -0.105 -2.882 -0.020 -6.147 -0.0333 -5.8380 -0.007 -1.822 
FEDUSEC -0.462 -14.213 -0.500 -12.337 -0.390 -7.148 -0.041 -10.758 -0.0603 -9.4430 -0.022 -5.086 
FEDUTER -0.633 -7.779 -0.673 -7.204 -0.568 -4.240 -0.048 -6.283 -0.0732 -6.4780 -0.027 -3.133 
FATHER_WORK -0.076 -3.120 -0.087 -2.776 -0.058 -1.510 -0.001 -0.316 -0.0017 -0.2480 0.000 0.035 
MEDUPRI -0.515 -13.526 -0.499 -9.948 -0.443 -7.017 -0.051 -13.880 -0.0681 -9.9530 -0.029 -7.228 
MEDUSEC -0.650 -10.722 -0.579 -6.593 -0.652 -6.508 -0.050 -8.853 -0.0550 -3.7330 -0.034 -6.584 
MEDUTER -0.488 -2.232 -0.569 -1.366 -0.446 -1.620 -0.040 -1.698 -0.0573 -0.8520 -0.027 -1.713 
MOTHER_WORK 0.071 1.910 -0.122 -2.238 0.238 4.291 0.026 3.488 -0.0010 -0.0870 0.037 4.037 
HINDU -0.030 -0.699 -0.159 -2.869 0.195 2.478 -0.009 -1.240 -0.0305 -2.3260 0.015 2.029 
MUSLIM -0.012 -0.220 0.021 0.316 0.003 0.037 -0.029 -4.390 -0.0348 -3.0390 -0.015 -1.899 
SOCGRP 0.248 14.153 0.275 12.260 0.223 7.763 0.018 5.872 0.0249 4.9030 0.012 3.470 
DEBT 0.168 7.475 0.149 5.130 0.190 5.270 0.018 4.314 0.0171 2.5240 0.016 3.338 
LAND -0.055 -1.334 -0.036 -0.662 -0.077 -1.121 -0.006 -0.911 -0.0001 -0.0050 -0.007 -0.871 
PARWAGE -0.0006 -10.155 -0.00064 -8.150 -0.00048 -4.920 -0.80D04 -7.728 -0.0001 -6.7470 -0.35D04 -3.267 
OTHINCOM -0.00010 -20.989 -0.0001 -15.654 -0.00012 -13.850 -0.10D04 -10.821 -0.10D04 -6.3590 -0.98D05 -8.863 
DEP -0.507 -5.810 -0.549 -4.962 -0.277 -1.832 -0.003 -0.198 -0.0319 -1.4960 0.032 1.938 
VILPROS -0.001 -11.479 -0.001 -8.651 -0.001 -6.291 0.000 -7.426 -0.0002 -5.9340 -0.66D04 -3.683 
PCNDP92 -0.0000075 -11.423 -0.0000045 -5.545 -0.000013 -10.991 -0.997D06 -8.952 -0.68D06 -3.8480 -0.13D05 -9.163 
GROWTH 0.041 9.326 0.037 6.686 0.060 8.140 0.010 12.246 0.0110 8.3100 0.009 9.600 
GROWTH2 -0.00019 -6.235 -0.00023 -6.018 -0.00024 -4.731 -0.53D04 -9.800 -0.68D04 -7.5580 -0.44D04 -7.288 
PROAGRI 0.011 6.655 0.009 4.367 -0.002 -0.632 0.001 1.950 0.0014 3.3710 -0.001 -4.253 
PRO-POOR -0.001 -0.061 -0.018 -1.288 0.031 1.809 0.002 1.357 -0.0026 -0.8410 0.005 2.741 
RHO(1,2) -0.984 -280.14 -0.994 -409.205 -0.945 -29.272       
Log likelihood fn. -40588.220   -19789.10   -20008.14         
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Table 4: Predicted Probabilities by State 
 School Work 
 ALL Girls Boys ALL Girls Boys 
General 0.716 0.645 0.767 0.026 0.020 0.028 
Andhra Pradesh 0.653 0.576 0.721 0.034 0.031 0.038 
Bihar 0.539 0.387 0.648 0.016 0.007 0.024 
Gujarat 0.784 0.717 0.833 0.025 0.032 0.021 
Haryana 0.745 0.620 0.832 0.023 0.011 0.025 
Karnataka 0.671 0.575 0.759 0.041 0.037 0.040 
Kerala 0.898 0.904 0.898 0.005 0.004 0.008 
Madhya Pradesh 0.632 0.529 0.706 0.027 0.016 0.037 
Maharashtra 0.808 0.750 0.859 0.018 0.023 0.016 
Orissa 0.564 0.427 0.676 0.042 0.032 0.046 
Punjab 0.827 0.766 0.863 0.009 0.001 0.016 
Rajasthan 0.554 0.308 0.756 0.072 0.102 0.038 
Tamil Nadu 0.778 0.731 0.821 0.032 0.046 0.000 
Uttar Pradesh 0.628 0.497 0.722 0.025 0.014 0.031 
West Bengal 0.704 0.651 0.751 0.030 0.033 0.031 
Note: Predicted probabilities are calculated with all variables being held at state-level mean values, except 
those for the scenario under consideration in each case. 
 
Table 5: Predicted Probabilities by variables 
 
  School Work 
  ALL  GIRLS BOYS ALL  GIRLS BOYS 
General 0.676 0.574 0.755 0.026 0.020 0.028 
PCNDP = max 0.768 0.704 0.817 0.008 0.002 0.015 
PCNDP = min 0.618 0.495 0.716 0.046 0.057 0.040 
GROWTH = max 0.608 0.408 0.767 0.063 0.103 0.033 
GROWTH  = min 0.654 0.552 0.730 0.007 0.002 0.015 
PROAGRI = max 0.593 0.422 0.730 0.036 0.019 0.036 
PROAGRI = min 0.754 0.719 0.780 0.018 0.022 0.021 
PRO-POOR = max 0.694 0.599 0.763 0.026 0.023 0.026 
PRO-POOR = min 0.663 0.555 0.749 0.026 0.018 0.030 
Note: Predicted probabilities are calculated with all variables being held at state-level mean values, except 
those for the scenario under consideration in each case. 
 
Table 6: Results for Child Schooling & Work: with Growth * NDP 
  ALL   BOYS   GIRLS   
Variable Coefficient  t-ratio Coefficient  t-ratio Coefficient  t-ratio 
 SCHOOL SCHOOL SCHOOL 
Constant -2.652 -26.164 -3.592 -24.888 -2.286 -15.610 
AGE 0.681 54.620 0.797 45.840 0.598 32.593 
AGE2 -0.035 -55.501 -0.039 -44.953 -0.032 -35.142 
PERSEX -0.490 -38.768         
FEDUPRI 0.132 7.925 0.164 6.729 0.128 5.425 
FEDUSEC 0.387 18.379 0.393 12.506 0.401 13.711 
FEDUTER 0.583 14.105 0.533 8.540 0.645 11.502 
FATHER_WORK 0.163 9.100 0.154 6.194 0.183 6.919 
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MEDUPRI 0.310 11.357 0.307 7.606 0.276 7.161 
MEDUSEC 0.581 15.490 0.549 9.716 0.568 10.779 
MEDUTER 0.449 4.159 0.501 3.094 0.365 2.401 
MOTHER_WORK 0.103 3.484 0.204 4.594 0.036 0.877 
HINDU 0.014 0.448 0.137 3.061 -0.086 -1.918 
MUSLIM -0.346 -9.620 -0.289 -5.644 -0.401 -7.715 
SOCGRP -0.311 -24.238 -0.316 -17.727 -0.315 -16.650 
DEBT -0.169 -9.991 -0.157 -6.709 -0.186 -7.311 
FEMILIT -0.198 -9.282 -0.076 -3.333 -0.683 -13.802 
MALEILI -0.364 -29.146 -0.368 -15.804 -0.311 -19.750 
LAND 0.051 1.634 0.064 1.408 0.050 1.083 
PARWAGE 0.000 9.052 0.000 4.760 0.000 8.346 
OTHINCOM 0.000 34.142 0.000 25.605 0.000 24.959 
DEP 1.020 14.617 0.746 7.627 1.442 14.004 
VILPROS 0.001 14.628 0.001 8.587 0.001 12.505 
PCNDP 0.000 10.932 0.000 9.065 0.000 6.343 
GROWTH*NDPL -0.004 -6.961 -0.001 -1.501 -0.008 -8.302 
GROWTH*NDPM -0.003 -3.455 -0.003 -2.653 -0.003 -2.246 
GROWTH*NDPH -0.006 -6.895 -0.006 -4.458 -0.007 -5.298 
PROAGRI -0.011 -7.598 -0.010 -4.772 -0.013 -6.104 
PRO-POOR 0.072 8.998 0.035 3.080 0.105 9.227 
 WORK WORK WORK 
Constant -4.790 -22.410 -3.772 -13.757 -6.279 -17.729 
AGE 0.196 6.311 0.076 1.887 0.398 7.890 
AGE2 0.003 2.032 0.009 5.220 -0.008 -3.568 
PERSEX -0.186 -10.626         
FEDUPRI -0.166 -7.192 -0.217 -7.097 -0.096 -2.662 
FEDUSEC -0.456 -14.096 -0.499 -12.320 -0.380 -6.945 
FEDUTER -0.610 -7.245 -0.649 -6.491 -0.549 -4.327 
FATHER_WORK -0.067 -2.735 -0.081 -2.561 -0.041 -1.056 
MEDUPRI -0.522 -13.401 -0.504 -9.543 -0.459 -7.429 
MEDUSEC -0.667 -11.232 -0.580 -6.749 -0.682 -6.898 
MEDUTER -0.468 -2.129 -0.537 -1.342 -0.391 -1.471 
MOTHER_WORK 0.078 2.080 -0.110 -1.957 0.231 4.216 
HINDU -0.050 -1.129 -0.189 -3.371 0.188 2.351 
MUSLIM -0.020 -0.386 -0.002 -0.028 0.006 0.065 
SOCGRP 0.252 14.174 0.269 11.871 0.239 8.271 
DEBT 0.155 6.844 0.139 4.737 0.167 4.605 
LAND -0.021 -0.513 0.002 0.036 -0.046 -0.670 
PARWAGE -0.001 -10.108 -0.001 -8.109 0.000 -4.994 
OTHINCOM 0.000 -20.743 0.000 -15.585 0.000 -13.349 
DEP -0.504 -5.663 -0.508 -4.416 -0.323 -2.135 
VILPROS -0.001 -11.080 -0.001 -8.354 -0.001 -6.252 
PCNDP92 0.000 -14.284 0.000 -10.040 0.000 -10.806 
GROWTH*NDPL 0.018 19.760 0.009 7.859 0.029 19.533 
GROWTH*NDPM 0.024 20.175 0.016 10.693 0.036 18.274 
GROWTH*NDPH 0.023 17.380 0.016 9.618 0.033 14.865 
PROAGRI 0.027 12.973 0.027 10.221 0.019 5.105 
PRO-POOR 0.022 2.133 0.006 0.451 0.060 3.642 
              
RHO(1,2) -0.985 -274.906 -0.993 -351.737 -0.958 -39.354 
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Appendix 1a: Data Description of Dummy Variables in the Model. 
 
Dummy Variables Description  No: of 1s Prop. Of 1s Missing NOBS 
SCHOOL 
Identifies the primary activity of the child; coded 1 if the primary activity is 
stated to be work, else coded 0 
(1=primary activity is attending school) 
 
49302 
 
64.85 % 
 
- 
 
76027 
WORK  
Identifies the primary activity of the child, coded 1if the primary activity is 
stated to be attending school else coded 0.(1= primary activity is going for work) 
 
5432 
 
7.14 % 
 
- 
 
76027 
SEX Gender of the child, coded 1=Girls 0=Boys; (1=Girl) 35243 46.41% 12 76015 
FEDUPRI Father’s primary Education; coded, 1=primary education else=0 10960 14.43%  
 
84 
 
 
 
75943 
 
FEDUSEC ,Father’s secondary education; coded, 1=secondary education else coded 0 8238 10.85% 
FEDUTER Father’s tertiary education; coded 1=tertiary education else coded 0 2221 2.90% 
FATHER_WORK  
Father’s employment; Binary variable coded 0=No work, else 1 
(employed=1) 
Q: If the principal activity of the father was working, did he work more or less 
regularly in the last 365 days? 
 
 
63669 
 
 
89.6% 
 
 
4949 
 
 
71078 
MEDUPRI Mother’s primary Education; coded, 1=primary education else=0 4804 7.32%  
 
 
9402 
 
 
 
66625 
MEDUSEC ,Mother’s secondary education; coded, 1=secondary education else coded 0 3385 5.1% 
MEDUTER Mother’s tertiary education; coded 1=tertiary education else coded 0 396 0.59% 
MOTHER_WORK  
Mother’s employment; coded 0=No work, else 1 
(employed=1) 
Q: The principal activity status of the mother  
 
23116 
 
34.7% 
 
9390 
 
66637 
HINDU 
Religion of the household: coded Hindu=1, else 0 
(Hindu=1) 
64014 84.2% - 76027 
MUSLIM 
Religion of the household: coded Muslim=1, else 0 
(Muslim=1) 
8101 10.7% - 76027 
SOCGRP Social Group of the household; 1=scheduled castes and tribes; 0 = all others. 21198 27.8  21198 
DEBT 
Household debt: coded 0 = no debt, else =1. 
(if the household has debt=1) 
8863 11.6% - 76027 
LAND 
Indicates whether households own any land; coded 1 if they posses any land  else 
coded 0 
73442 96.6% - 76027 
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Appendix 1b: Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables 
Continuous Variables Description  Mean S.D Minimum Maximum NOBS 
AGE Age of the child 9.768 3.13 5 15 76027 
AGE2 Age*Age 104.28 62.82 25 225 76027 
FEMILIT 
Household female illiteracy i.e. the number of females who are illiterate as a 
proportion of all females in the household 
0.4 0.3 0 1 76027 
MALEILIT 
Household male illiteracy i.e. the number of males who are illiterate as a 
proportion of all males in the household 
0.60 0.52 0 6 76027 
DEP 
Number of dependants in the household: this included those members below the 
age of 5 and above the age of 60 yrs 
1.05 1.2 0 10 76027 
OTHINCOM Household monthly expenditure-(mother wage+father wage+child wage) 1846.17 2215.0 -2933.0 375428.0
8
 76027 
PARWAGE Mother wage + father wage 93.34 190.5 0 3700 70488 
VILPROS Average village wages (male &female) 132.48 94.86 0 802.39 68158 
EXPEDU 
State expenditure on education (capital expenditure) as a proportion of the SGDP 
(current prices) during the period 1985-92 
0.48 0.3 0.1 0.9 76027 
PROAGRI State agriculture as a proportion of the SGDP (current prices) 1982-92 32.60 6.94 18.39 45.33 76027 
SNDP Per capita net state domestic product (constant prices) for  1992 75827.4 26196.738 42749.6 137705.3 76027 
GROWTH Simple Growth rate of states over a period of 10 years (1982-92) at constant prices 62.43 17.48 37.81 97 76027 
GROWTH*SNDPL 
Interactive term between Growth (1982-1992) and Percapita GDP (1982) for states 
categorised as low growth. Per capita GDP was coded 1 if it was above 37918 and 
below 50143, else was coded 0 and then this was interacted with Growth 
 
 
23.85 
  
 
0 
 
 
97 
 
 
76027 
GROWTH*SNDPM 
Interactive term between Growth (1982-1992) and Percapita GDP (1982) for states 
categorised as low growth. It was coded 1 if Per capita GDP was above 50144 and 
below 60298, else was coded 0 and then this was interacted with Growth 
 
 
24.05 
  
 
0 
 
 
93.2 
 
 
76027 
GROWTH*SNDPH 
Interactive term between Growth (1982-1992) and Percapita GDP (1982) for states 
categorised as low growth. It was coded 1 if Per capita GDP was above 60298, 
else was coded 0 and then this was interacted with Growth 
 
 
14.52 
  
 
0 
 
 
85.5 
 
 
76027 
 
PRO-POOR 
 
Correlation between Mean Consumption & Squared Poverty Gap (Dutt & 
Ravallion, 1998) is -.691, which we set as the average for All India. Then we 
computed a variable X, which gives the reduction in poverty across states for I unit 
increase in mean consumption. PRO-POOR is the difference between the squared 
poverty Gap and X. 
 
 
2.35 
 
 
.87 
 
 
1.1 
 
 
4.06 
 
 
76027 
                                                          
8
 This maximum is caused by a single outlier. Excluding this outlier, the mean was 1841.26 and standard deviation was 1753.01. The maximum was 
50609.72. 
 38 
 
